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Executive Summary
DO CONTEXTUAL EFFECTS BIAS KENTUCKY SCHOOL DISTRICT
ACCOUNTABILITY INDEX SCORES?
Kentucky’s system of high-stakes accountability raises the question:  Should teachers and
school administrators be held accountable for student test results if the scores are influenced by
external factors over which these educators have no control?  The goal of the present study is to
investigate if such external factors, or “contextual effects,” bias the accountability index scores. 
The issue is important because school districts, schools, and educators should be assessed in a fair
manner.
The focus of the study is on the Kentucky school district accountability index scores for
the 1992-94 and 1994-96 biennia.  District scores, rather than school scores, were chosen as the
focus because more suitable measures of contextual effects are available for school districts than
for schools.   Three contextual effects are considered: (1) median household income in the district,
(2) teen birth rate, and (3) rural-metropolitan differences among districts. 
Two ways of determining the influence of contextual effects on the test scores are dealt
with.  First, contextual effects might retard or promote a school district’s ability to improve its
scores.  A confirmation of this tendency would pose a serious problem for the current
accountability system.  Second, contextual effects might only influence the differences in scores
between school districts.  This finding would not challenge Kentucky’s current procedure of
recognizing improvement, which compares the present performance against the previous biennial
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score within each educational unit.  But it could mean that disadvantaged districts and schools will
lag behind the advantaged ones no matter how much they improve on their benchmarks.  This
becomes a salient issue for the State’s long-range goal of having all schools and districts achieve
proficiency within twenty years.
A second set of analyses was done on the fourth, eighth, and twelfth grade scores within
each school district.  These analyses corroborate the results obtained from studying the overall
district-level scores.  Moreover, the grade-level results provide evidence whether contextual
effects also influence the performance of individual schools.
The major findings of the study are:
• Contextual effects have little influence on the change in scores within districts. This
finding supports the argument of high-stakes accountability advocates who assert that,
since improvement is measured within a district or school, externally imposed advantages
or disadvantages will not affect the result.
• Contextual effects have a large influence on differences in the scores between districts.  In
this instance, between 30 and 40 percent of the variation in the scores is attributable to
contextual effects.  Median household income is the strongest of these effects.  Rural-
metro differences are next strongest, followed by the teen birth rate.  These findings warn
of a danger of very substantial bias when school districts and schools are ranked using
their accountability scores without first controlling for contextual effects.
• When the contextual effects are controlled, rural school districts perform better than their
accountability scores suggest and better than metro districts.  Metro school districts, on
the other hand, perform less well than their scores suggest and less well than their rural
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counterparts.  The reason for these findings may be that rural school districts have less
bureaucracy to contend with and stronger community support than metropolitan districts. 
However, this advantage of rural districts only becomes evident when the effects of
median household income and teen birth rate are held constant.
• On average, the independent school districts score higher than county school districts on
the accountability tests.  After adding the contextual effects on the district scores, it was
found that all of the positive and negative outliers were independent districts.  In other
words, when district scores are compared statewide and the contextual effects are held
constant, the highest and lowest performing districts are independents.
• The analyses of fourth, eighth, and twelfth grade scores in each district generally support
the results obtained from the overall district-level analyses.  The contextual effects are
found to increase with the grade level.  These results suggest that contextual effects will
also influence cross-school comparisons of scores but not within-school improvement in
scores.  As above, these results bode well for Kentucky’s short-run accountability goals
but raise a note of caution about whether disadvantaged schools can achieve the long-run
objective of proficiency.
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Background
Recent educational reform initiatives in the United States focus on monitoring and
improving outcomes and holding school districts and schools accountable for what their students
learn (Ladd 1996).  The current interest in performance-based education reflects in part the desire
of top management, consumers and taxpayers alike to see organizational efficiency enhanced in
many arenas--from private business and medical care to the military and education.  But purely
educational concerns also spur the interest in performance-based education.  First, there is a
widespread alarm that American children are not being sufficiently well trained to compete with
other countries.  More effective learning must be promoted to keep the U.S. labor force
competitive.  Second, the costs of education in the United States appear to have grown rapidly
while what children learn does not show a corresponding increase.1  Because of this, legislators
and taxpayers are questioning if they are getting their money’s worth in public education.  Third,
it is argued that the U.S. educational system must become more productive since funds to support
education could be less available in the future.  For many people, increasing the accountability of
teachers and school systems is felt to be a way to address each of these concerns.
Currently, there are two main views about how to obtain greater efficiency and
accountability in educational systems.  The first view opts for creating an open market of
educational services through voucher plans or tax rebates that offset the costs of alternative
schooling.  Parents in the role of consumers can then choose whichever school they believe will
best educate their child.  This perspective relies on competition between schools (within the public
1Ladd (1996: 2-3) argues that the perception in the United States that the costs of
education have been increasing sharply is incorrect.
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sector but also between the public and private sectors) to foster efficiency and academic
excellence.  Advocates say that parents will want their children to attend the better, more efficient
schools.  When such choices are aggregated, schools that are too inefficient to compete for a
“market share” of students will fail, leaving only the more efficient schools.  The second view on
attaining more effective schools relies on an administered system of accountability that recognizes
and rewards success in the public schools.  This perspective has the advantage of the first because
it keeps the present administrative structure of public school systems largely intact while
reforming that structure to achieve accountability goals.  Realistically speaking, an administered
accountability system may be the only choice for states like Kentucky that have many rural school
districts.  Because of the higher cost of delivering education to rural areas, the open-
market/parental-choice approach seems better suited for metropolitan areas.
Over the past decade these same forces have set the stage for a radical change in
Kentucky’s educational system, but concerns more specific to the State provided the immediate
motivation for reform.  Kentucky students had a record of performing below the national average
on achievement tests, and high school graduation rates were low.  The catalyst for reform was a
law suit in which the Kentucky Supreme Court upheld a lower court decision that the State’s
educational system was unconstitutional.  Public schools were not being funded equitably, and
Kentucky students did not have equal educational opportunities.
The Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990 (KERA) launched one of the nation’s most
ambitious educational reform efforts of recent decades (Elmore, Abelmann, and Fuhrman 1996). 
One of KERA’s most noteworthy accomplishments has been the high-stakes performance
assessment program, called the Kentucky Instructional Results Information System (KIRIS).  This
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program embraced a complex procedure for testing students using authentic assessment methods.
The results from the assessments have become the basis for granting monetary rewards to schools
that show significant improvement and to levy sanctions against those that fail to show progress
(Guskey 1994).  Controversial from the start, attacks on KIRIS have intensified recently and may
lead to substantial changes in the accountability program.  Still, the demand in Kentucky for an
effective means of assessing and improving educational performance will not go away.  Whatever
the shortcomings, KIRIS has put educators on notice that improved performance is expected.
The Present Study
The design and implementation of an administered accountability system raise many thorny
questions (Coleman 1995; Ladd 1996):  Who should be held accountable?  Teachers and school
officials primarily, or should parents and students be held accountable too?  How will educational
outcomes be measured?  With criterion-referenced tests or with more “authentic” procedures such
as writing portfolios and group problem-solving activities, even if the latter methods are expensive
to administer and score?  Whatever the method of assessment, how will problems such as
“teaching to the test” and cheating be minimized?  What is an appropriate way to link
performance to rewards and sanctions?  Finally, can performance be measured in a way that is fair
to all school systems despite strong disparities of wealth, community mores, and geographic
location?
The present study addresses only the last of these questions.  It examines the Kentucky
accountability index scores for public school districts during two biennia, 1992-94 and 1994-96. 
The purpose of the analysis is to find out the extent to which external contextual effects bias the
scores and thus detract from their usefulness as measures for accountability.  The issue is that
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teachers and school administrators should not be held accountable for socioeconomic factors that
influence student performance but are beyond the control of school personnel.  If such contextual
effects are discovered to bias the accountability scores, the system is unfair.
Research on Contextual Effects and Educational Outcomes
In this study, the term “contextual effects” refers to factors in the social environment of a
school district which influence student performance on the accountability test.  Contextual effects
are external to the schools and are not subject to the direct control of teachers and administrators.
 Studies showing that contextual effects do indeed influence educational outcomes are not new. 
Equality of Educational Opportunity (Coleman et al. 1966) reached the (at the time surprising and
highly controversial) conclusion that much variation in student performance was not the result of
differences between schools but was due instead to the disparate family and community
backgrounds of students.  Since this watershed study, many studies (for instance, Coleman 1988,
1990; Hallinan 1988; Schneider and Coleman 1993; Smith, Beaulieu, and Israel 1992; Teachman,
Carver, and Paasch 1997) have reaffirmed the importance of contextual effects.2  Many of these
studies have employed large national probability samples of students such as the High School and
Beyond Database and the National Educational Longitudinal Study Database.  One pre-KERA
study in Kentucky noted the effect of economic deprivation on school district performance
(Guskey and Kifer 1990).  To date, most of the research has focused on how student achievement
varies with the family’s socioeconomic circumstances and social capital resources.3  The issue of
2Effective schools research commonly employs family SES indicators to capture external
factors that influence learning (Hanushek 1997; Lee, Smith, and Croninger 1997; Zigarelli 1996).
3James Coleman (1988, 1990) introduced the idea of “social capital” to embrace a set of
factors that must be considered when explaining student outcomes.  These factors included
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how community-level factors affect educational outcomes is less studied, but examples of this
type of research do exist (Crane 1991; Garner and Raudenbush 1991).
The objective of the present study is to contribute to the growing body of research-based
literature that examines contextual effects and educational outcomes.  For reasons discussed
below, this study focuses on how community context affects school district accountability index
scores.  With caution the results can be extrapolated to schools.
Method
The analysis uses a multivariate technique known as repeated measures general linear
modeling.  Multivariate analysis has one great disadvantage: lay people have difficulty
understanding it.  Nevertheless, simple cross-tabulations and correlations are inadequate to
address the problem of contextual effects and the fairness of the accountability scores.  A likely
consequence of using these simpler methods would be to exaggerate the importance of contextual
effects.  Therefore, a multivariate approach offers a more demanding test of these effects.
Dependent Variables
Accountability index scores are calculated annually for each school and school district in
the state and derive in part from tests administered to fourth, eighth, and twelfth graders4 and in
part from noncognitive criteria, including attendance, retention, dropout, and transition to adult
life.  Under KERA, greater attention has been devoted to school performance than to district
norms, socialization processes, and social structures within the family and within the community
that enable children to be successful in school.
4Problems with twelfth graders’ lack of incentive to take the tests has prompted a change
in which the cognitive tests are administered to eleventh graders instead of twelfth graders. 
Writing portfolios are still collected from twelfth graders.  This change in the testing procedures
was made in the 1993-94 school year. 
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performance.  Therefore, the most germane point of attack would be to investigate if contextual
effects influence school performance.  Unfortunately, good measures of school-level contextual
effects are not available.  Several measures often used to suggest contextual effects are really
student body characteristics--for example, the percent of students receiving free and reduced-cost
lunch or the percent of minority students enrolled in the school.  It is doubtful that either of these
measures accurately represents the composition of the communities in which the schools are
found.  Characteristics of the schools themselves are even less satisfactory as measures of
contextual effects.  Per student spending, size of enrollment, and teacher-student ratio--to name
some common examples--are partly controlled by the school administration, possibly with
community input, and partly controlled by the district and the State.
Compared with the fuzzy measures of contextual effects that are available for schools,
good measures for the contextual effects within school districts can be found in census reports
and similar sources.  These data accurately represent characteristics of the local population.  The
focus of this study, therefore, is on school districts and using district accountability scores as the
dependent variables.  In addition, contextual effects on grade-level scores within districts will be
looked into.  If the results of the district-level analyses are sufficiently strong and if the grade-level
analyses support the district-level analyses, one can also make inferences about contextual effects
on the school level.
School District Accountability Index Scores.  In Kentucky, the margin of improvement in
student scores during one two-year period compared with the preceding period determines
accountability.  These biennial weighted mean scores are less volatile and more reliable than
single-year scores.  The first set of dependent variables used in this study consists of the 1992-94
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and 1994-96 weighted mean scores for each school district.
Grade-Level Accountability Index Scores by School District.  Using grade-level scores
as a second set of dependent variables allows testing for corroboration with the overall district-
level results.  This analysis will also give insight into the contextual effects at a level of
aggregation that more closely approximates schools.  Two-year simple mean scores for each
grade level were constructed from the annual scores provided by the Kentucky Department of
Education.  For example, a 1992-94 fourth-grade district mean score was calculated by averaging
the 1992-93 and 1993-94 fourth-grade mean scores.  Since the resulting biennial mean has not
been weighted by grade enrollment, measurement error may occur.  However, the assumption is
made that grade enrollments will not change enough from the first academic year to the second to
invalidate this estimate of the biennial grade-level performance.  The grade-level mean scores that
were calculated in this manner represent the same two biennial periods as the district scores.
Contextual Effects
The objective was to choose a mix of contextual effects including an SES measure, such
as household income, and also geographic and demographic characteristics of the county
associated with each school district.  A measure of the strength of local norms that encourage
commitment toward schooling was sought as well. 
Fixed effect.  In the analyses that follow, the “rural-metro index” measures the combined
effects of geographic location and population concentration.  These factors are considered to have
an important bearing on educational outcomes.  Many studies have documented that student
performance is lower in rural than in urban and suburban areas. Sizeable concentrations of
populations offer greater amenities and resources than can be mustered in small towns and rural
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districts.  Other things being equal, larger population concentrations make it easier to deliver
educational programs and services (De Young 1991; Marino 1995; Stern 1994). 
The rural-metro index (RM_INDEX) was constructed by recoding the USDA Economic
Research Services’ 1993 Urban Influence Codes.  The Urban Influence Codes classify all U.S.
counties into 9 categories based on the size of the Metropolitan Statistical Area for metro
counties, and adjacency to MSA’s and size of the largest city for nonmetro counties.  To calculate
the index used in the present study, the first two categories of the Urban Influence Codes, which
differentiated small from large metropolitan areas, were collapsed.  The next four categories were
also collapsed into one category.  These four categories differentiated counties adjacent to small
versus large MSA’s by the size of their largest town or city.  The remaining categories of the
Urban Influence Codes were left as is.  Thus, the index used in this study has five categories,
scaled from 1 to 5 with metro counties being highest.  The resulting rural-metro index (see Table
1 and Figure 1) enables a comparison of the performance results of school districts in each
category.5  In the general linear models below, the index is a fixed effect rather than a covariate
like the remaining independent variables.  The reason for this is that there is a nonlinear relation
between the rural-metro index and the accountability scores, as will be seen.
Covariates.  The remaining contextual effect variables enter the general linear model as
covariates.  First, after some alternatives were considered, median family income for the school
5The analyses described in this paper were also done using the original Urban Influence
Codes.  The results of this unreported analysis were very similar to what is reported here except
that the rural-metro contrasts were somewhat obscured due to the larger number of ranked
categories.  The results will be made available on request.
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Table 1.  The Rural-Metro Index
Code Description
1 Nonmetro counties not adjacent to a metro area and with no city or a city with a
population less than 2,500
2 Nonmetro counties not adjacent to a metro area and with a city of 2,500 to 9,999
population
3 Nonmetro counties not adjacent to a metro area and with a city of 10,000 or more
4 Nonmetro counties physically adjacent to an MSA with at least 2 percent of the
employed labor force in the county commuting to the metro area
5 Metro counties (located in an MSA)
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district was chosen to measure the socioeconomic context.6  This measure is based on a special
run of the 1990 U.S. Census data and was obtained from the School District Data Book (National
Center for Educational Statistics).  Median family income is directly related to the rural-metro
index scale (Table 2). 
The second covariate is the county teen birth rate in 1992-94.7  This variable was chosen
as a proxy, or indirect measure, for the strength of local community norms supporting educational
achievement and persistence.  A high teen birth rate suggests a community in which school
achievement and completion is not a priority for many youths and their parents.  Teen birth rate is
inversely related to the rural-metro index scale and median household income (Table 2).
The last covariate is a dummy variable that indicates the school district is independent. 
Besides the 120 county school districts in Kentucky, there are 56 independent school districts. 
These independent districts are enclaves within 40 counties.  The most independent districts that
any county has are six.  Thirty of the counties have only one independent district.  A preliminary
analysis of the district scores found that the independent districts outperform the county districts. 
Although the median family income and teen birth rate in the independent districts do not differ
from the county districts, the independent districts are distributed unequally across the rural-metro
spectrum.  Independent districts are least likely to be found in rural counties with city populations
6Other prospective variables were considered, such as the income gini coefficient for each
district, percent of the adult population with a high school degree, and racial heterogeneity of the
population.  The first two variables were related to the dependent variables in zero-order
correlations but plunged to insignificance in multivariate analyses that also included median
household income.  Racial heterogeneity was not related to the independent variables even in
zero-order correlations.
7The teen birth rate is the number of births per 1,000 females, aged 12 to 17 years.  These
data were taken from the 1995 Kentucky KIDS COUNT.
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Table 2.  Breakdown of the Number of School Districts and the Covariates
by Rural-Metro Index Codes
Rural-Metro
Index
Code
Number
of School
Districts
Median
Household
Income
Teen
Birth
Rate
Independent
School
Districts
1 30 $15,026 22.8  2
2 41 $16,952 23.5 14
3 19 $18,678 22.2 11
4 44 $20,577 18.9 10
5 42 $27,602 18.5 19
Total 176 $20,258 20.9 56
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less than 2,500.  They are most common in rural counties with cities having populations greater
than 10,000, and are next most common in metro counties (Table 2).  Being smaller and more
geographically compact than the county school districts, independent districts probably reap
administrative efficiencies from less bureaucracy, lower transportation costs, and a stronger
organizational culture.  Another advantage of independent districts may be that they garner
stronger support from their local communities than do county school districts.  In Coleman’s
(1990) terminology, they may benefit from a greater stock of “social capital.”  Since the presence
of independent districts could confound the tests of the contextual effects, the analyses include
this variable as a control. 
Analyses
Contextual effects can impact district performance measures in two basic ways.  First, the
effects can influence progress or the lack of it within each school district.  That is to say, because
of adverse contextual effects some districts could have their ability to improve inhibited.  Other
districts because of beneficial contextual effects could receive a boost in performance.  The
discovery of a finding like this would be a blow to Kentucky’s educational reform effort.  One of
KERA’s guiding principles is that all schools and school districts (and all students) can
significantly improve their performance, no matter what their advantages or disadvantages. 
Between-districts comparisons of performance are a second way to show the consequences of
contextual effects for accountability scores.  Districts with adverse contexts would score lower
than districts with beneficial contexts, although the lower scoring districts might still show
improvement compared with their own previous efforts.  Since the State allocates rewards and
sanctions according to how well a district or school performs compared with its previous
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benchmark, between-districts comparisons are less of a concern for Kentucky’s accountability
initiative.  Nevertheless, the news media uses the accountability index scores to compare and rank
districts as well as schools.  The discovery that contextual effects bias such comparisons could
serve to inform the media and the public of the danger of using simplistic methods of comparison.
Longer term, there is a possibility that contextual effects do influence within-districts
scores.  This would be a concern, since all schools and school districts are expected to attain a
standard of proficiency within twenty years.  Contextually disadvantaged schools and districts
could fall far short of attaining the desired standard of proficiency even if their scores have been
increasing regularly. 
Repeated Measures General Linear Modeling
Repeated measures analysis is appropriate when measurement is made more than once on
each subject or case.  The procedure produces two distinct types of models.  One model employs
between-subjects factors and the other employs within-subjects factors.  A within-subjects factor
is any factor that distinguishes measurements made on the same subject or case rather than
distinguishing different subjects or cases.  In the analysis below, the factor labeled WDS (within-
district scores) was created to distinguish the 1992-94 and 1994-96 scores for each district.  The
within-districts model then tests for differences between each district’s two-year mean scores and
uses interaction terms to estimate the effect of each of the contextual variables on these same
within-district differences in scores.  The between-subjects model, by contrast, divides the sample
of subjects or cases into discrete subgroups related to the fixed effect, which in the present study
is the rural-metro index.  The index divides the 176 school districts into five mutually exclusive
groups.  The tests of the between-districts effects estimate regression parameters for the
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contextual variables on the differences in scores across districts.
Proper use of repeated measures analysis requires that one satisfy two assumptions: first,
that the observed covariance matrices of the within-subjects dependent variables are equal across
the groups; second, that the variance of each dependent variable is homogeneous across the
groups for the between-subjects analysis.  If these assumptions are not met, transforming the
dependent variables will sometimes fix the problem.  Because these assumptions were violated in
the present study, it was necessary to convert the raw district scores to natural logarithms.  Once
this transformation of the dependent variables was done, the assumptions were satisfied and the
analysis went forward.
Results
Analysis of District Scores
Within-Districts Model.  Between the biennia of 1992-94 and 1994-96 the overall mean
accountability score for the entire state increased from 39.3 to 44.6 (an increase of 13.5 percent).
 If the interest of this study were solely to find out if this meant that the within-district scores had
significantly improved, the repeated measures general linear model would not be necessary.  A
paired sample t-test to compare the difference between the means would suffice.  But it is not
enough simply to discover if the scores have increased.  It is also important to find out what
differences (if any) the contextual effects contribute to the differences in the scores.  The tests of
within-districts effects (Table 3) do this.  The interaction terms reveal whether the contextual
effects influence the analysis of variance.  Clearly, median household income is the only contextual
effect that contributes to variation in the within-districts scores.  The eta squared value indicates
that the size of this effect is small, since it explains only 3.3 percent of the variation.  Contextual
1 39.090 .000 .189
1 5.817 .017 .033
1 .861 .355 .005
1 1.659 .200 .010
4 1.257 .289 .029
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Source
WDS
WDS *
MEDHHINC
WDS *
TEENBRTH
WDS *
INDISTR
WDS *
RM_INDEX
Error(WDS)
df F Sig.
Eta
Squared
Table 3.  Tests of Within-Districts Effects
3.510 .042 83.423 .000
8.421E-06 .000 7.910 .000 .271
-3.856E-03 .001 -3.561 .000 .070
5.442E-02 .014 3.791 .000 .079
5.576E-02 .025 2.249 .026 .029
7.669E-02 .022 3.541 .001 .069
9.012E-02 .025 3.635 .000 .073
4.132E-02 .020 2.091 .038 .025
0c . . . .
3.677 .044 83.928 .000
6.683E-06 .000 6.028 .000 .178
-3.176E-03 .001 -2.817 .005 .045
4.190E-02 .015 2.803 .006 .045
1.949E-02 .026 .755 .451 .003
6.330E-02 .023 2.807 .006 .045
7.229E-02 .026 2.800 .006 .045
2.650E-02 .021 1.288 .200 .010
0c . . . .
Parameter
Intercept
MEDHHINC
TEENBRTH
INDISTR
[RM_INDEX=1]
[RM_INDEX=2]
[RM_INDEX=3]
[RM_INDEX=4]
[RM_INDEX=5]
Intercept
MEDHHINC
TEENBRTH
INDISTR
[RM_INDEX=1]
[RM_INDEX=2]
[RM_INDEX=3]
[RM_INDEX=4]
[RM_INDEX=5]
Dependent
Variable
1992-94
district
score (log)
a
1994-96
district
score (log)
b
B Std. Error t Sig.
Eta
Squared
Table 4.  Parameter Estimates of Between-Districts Effects
Adjusted R-square = .423a.
Adjusted R-square = .331b.
This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.c.
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effects, therefore, have little to no impact on within-districts scores.8
Between-Districts Model.  It is also important to know if the contextual effects influence
the differences in scores between districts.  On this point, the answer is a resounding yes.  The
parameter estimates for the between districts model (Table 4) show that, after controlling for the
possibly confounding influence of independent districts, all the contextual measures are
significant.  Median household income is the strongest predictor of higher scores in both biennia,
while teen birth rate has a negative effect, as expected.  The rural-metro index has a nonlinear
relationship with the scores.  In 1992-94, the first four categories of the rural-metro index are
positive in their effects.  Since metro counties are the reference category, this means that metro
school districts are outperformed by all other types in this biennium.  Furthermore, rural counties
with cities having populations greater than 2,500 perform better than all others.  In 1994-96, rural
counties whose cities are greater than 2,500 in population again outperform all other types. 
However, metro school districts do about as well as districts in metro adjacent counties and rural
counties having cities with populations less than 2,500 in this biennium.
In a multivariate test of between-districts effects that averaged the results from both
biennia (not shown), the eta squared values were: median household income (0.244), teen birth
rate (0.063), independent district (0.067), and rural-metro index (0.090).  Thus, rural-metro
differences rank second in overall importance behind median household income.
8This conclusion was supported by two other analyses not reported here:  First, the
difference in the within-districts scores for the two biennia was regressed on the same group of
independent variables.  No effects were found.  Second, districts receiving rewards versus districts
not receiving rewards in 1994 and in 1996 were regressed on the independent variables.  Again,
the contextual effects were not significant in these logistic regression equations.  The results of
these analyses are available on request.
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How well the between-districts models predict the scores can be judged from the adjusted
R-square values.  The 1992-94 model explains 42 percent of the variance in scores.  In the
following biennium, the explained variance drops to 33 percent.  Whether this decline in the
importance of the contextual effects portends a real trend cannot be decided from only two
biennia of performance data. 
A graphical presentation (Figure 2) illustrates these findings in a more striking way.  The
graph contrasts the actual biennial mean scores with the mean scores predicted by the between-
districts model,9 after segmenting the scores by the rural-metro categories.  The graph shows that
when the effects of median household income, teen birth rate, and independent school districts are
held constant, the more rural school districts do better than suggested by their actual mean scores,
while metro districts do considerably worse.  No explanation of this finding is possible using the
data available.  However, one may suppose that if independent school districts have an advantage
because of their smaller size and greater social capital, similar advantages may accrue to rural
school districts once the disadvantages of low household income and high teen birth rate are
controlled.10  The graph also makes it clear that nonmetro counties with larger towns and metro
adjacent counties are the least affected by median household income and teen birth rate.
Outliers.  The general linear model will produce a predicted biennial mean11 and a
9The general linear model generated a predicted mean score for each district, expressed in
a natural logarithm.  The exponential function was then used to rescale the predicted scores and
make them comparable with the actual mean scores.
10See Stern (1994: chap. 9) for a discussion of this and related issues.
11Again, the exponential function was used to rescale the logarithmic means and make
them comparable with the actual means.
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standardized residual for each school district (see the Appendix for the complete list).  The
standardized residual tells how much the district’s actual mean score deviates from that predicted
by the between-districts model.  School districts with standardized residuals that are equal to or
greater than 2 or that are equal to or less than - 2 are termed “outliers.”  When z-residual ≥ 2, the
district is performing better than expected.  When z-residual ≤ -2, the district is performing worse
than expected.  An examination of the outliers may give clues why these cases are exceptional.
Seventeen school districts are outliers in one or both biennia (Table 5), and the negative
outliers slightly outnumber the positive ones.  The outliers are distributed across all rural-metro
categories.  What is most striking about the outliers is that, without exception, they are
independent school districts.  Why this should be is problematic.  It has been suggested that
independent districts are advantaged compared with county districts.  On average, they have
higher accountability scores.  But an inspection of the outliers reveals an important exception to
this.  In a little more than 10 percent of the independent districts, accountability scores are less
than expected when compared with other districts, after correcting for the contextual effects. 
Three of the independent districts are negative in both biennia.  However, every negative outlier
showed an increase in score between the first and the second biennium.  Therefore, it is only when
compared with other school districts that these districts appear to perform below par. 
No explanation for why only independent districts are outliers can be directly gleaned from
the data used in this study.  Perhaps their smaller size and geographic compactness may provide a
clue for explaining this finding.  Smaller school districts may have more homogeneous student
populations and community environments.  Depending on whether the local context helps or
21
Table 5.  Outliers from Between-Districts Analyses
District Name Rural-Metro
     Index
1992-94 1994-96
Augusta Ind.
Cloverpoint Ind.
Covington Ind.
Dayton Ind.
Fairview Ind.
Ft. Thomas Ind.
Jenkins Ind.
Middlesboro Ind.
Murray Ind.
Newport Ind.
Paintsville Ind.
Pikeville Ind.
Providence Ind.
Science Hill Ind.
Southgate Ind.
West Point Ind.
Williamsburg Ind.
        4
        1
        5
        5
        5
        4
        2
        3
        3
        5
        2
        2
        4
        2
        5
        4
        2
      -
      -
      -
      -
      -
      +
      -
      +
      +
      +
      +
      -
      -
      -
      +
      -
      -
      +
      -
      -
      +
               - = observed score is significantly less than the predicted score.
   + = observed score is significantly greater than the predicted score.
   [blank] = district is not an outlier in the biennium.
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hinders student learning, this homogeneity can have either sharply positive or negative
consequences.
Analysis of Grade-Level Scores by District
This study focuses on district accountability scores because good measures of contextual
effects are available at this level of aggregation.  The results cannot simply be extrapolated to the
school level without danger of aggregation bias.  Nevertheless, because mean scores for grades 4,
8, and 12 in each district are available, these data allow testing the presence of contextual effects
on different grade levels both within and between districts.  While not a school-level analysis as
such, it gives a closer approximation than the previous tests.  The grade-level analyses will also
reveal how the contextual effects vary by grade.
Grade 4.  The within-districts tests at the fourth grade (WDS_04) level (Table 6) show
that scores have improved during the two biennia without any influences from the contextual
effects.  Between-districts effects (Table 7) are weak at this grade level.  Median household
income is the only contextual effect that is significant in both biennia, and the strength of this
effect in 1994-96 is half what it was in 1992-94.  Neither teen birth rate nor rural-metro
differences have important consequences for primary school performance.
Grade 8.  The within-districts tests at the eighth grade level (Table 8) show an
improvement in accountability scores during the two biennia, although the increase is less at this
grade level than for fourth graders.  Again, contextual effects do not contribute to this increase in
the scores.  The grade 8 between-districts effects (Table 9) are more pronounced than in the
fourth grade.  Median household income, teen birth rate, and rural-metro differences are all
significant.  The metro school districts fare less well than most of the other rural-metro categories.
1 35.592 .000 .175
1 3.320 .070 .019
1 .029 .865 .000
1 .044 .833 .000
4 .880 .477 .021
168
Source
WDS_04
WDS_04 *
MEDHHINC
WDS_04 *
TEENBRTH
WDS_04 *
INDISTR
WDS_04 *
RM_INDEX
Error(WDS_04)
df F Sig.
Eta
Squared
Table 6.  Tests of Grade 4 Within-Districts Effects
3.468 .057 60.319 .000
7.495E-06 .000 5.152 .000 .136
-7.451E-04 .001 -.504 .615 .002
7.416E-03 .020 .378 .706 .001
2.767E-02 .034 .817 .415 .004
4.484E-02 .030 1.516 .132 .013
7.823E-02 .034 2.310 .022 .031
3.260E-02 .027 1.208 .229 .009
0c . . . .
3.723 .062 59.892 .000
5.395E-06 .000 3.430 .001 .065
-5.452E-04 .002 -.341 .734 .001
4.140E-03 .021 .195 .845 .000
-1.816E-02 .037 -.496 .621 .001
2.324E-02 .032 .726 .469 .003
4.135E-02 .037 1.129 .261 .008
9.253E-03 .029 .317 .752 .001
0c . . . .
Parameter
Intercept
MEDHHINC
TEENBRTH
INDISTR
[RM_INDEX=1]
[RM_INDEX=2]
[RM_INDEX=3]
[RM_INDEX=4]
[RM_INDEX=5]
Intercept
MEDHHINC
TEENBRTH
INDISTR
[RM_INDEX=1]
[RM_INDEX=2]
[RM_INDEX=3]
[RM_INDEX=4]
[RM_INDEX=5]
Dependent
Variable
1992-94
grade 4
district
score (log)
a
1994-96
grade 4
district
score (log)
b
B Std. Error t Sig.
Eta
Squared
Table 7.   Parameter Estimates of Grade 4 Between-Districts Effects
Adjusted R-square = .156a.
Adjusted R-square = .086b.
This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.c.
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1 8.121 .005 .046
1 2.533 .113 .015
1 .276 .600 .002
1 1.927 .167 .011
4 .600 .663 .014
168
Source
WDS_08
WDS_08 *
MEDHHINC
WDS_08 *
TEENBRTH
WDS_08 *
INDISTR
WDS_08 *
RM_INDEX
Error(WDS_08)
df F Sig.
Eta
Squared
Table 8.  Tests of Grade 8 Within-Districts Effects
3.532 .053 66.080 .000
8.851E-06 .000 6.545 .000 .203
-5.335E-03 .001 -3.879 .000 .082
4.607E-02 .018 2.527 .012 .037
7.224E-02 .031 2.294 .023 .030
.115 .028 4.181 .000 .094
.103 .031 3.282 .001 .060
6.149E-02 .025 2.450 .015 .034
0c . . . .
3.643 .054 67.630 .000
7.106E-06 .000 5.214 .000 .139
-4.749E-03 .001 -3.426 .001 .065
2.555E-02 .018 1.390 .166 .011
4.245E-02 .032 1.337 .183 .011
.114 .028 4.122 .000 .092
.102 .032 3.229 .001 .058
6.014E-02 .025 2.377 .019 .033
0c . . . .
Parameter
Intercept
MEDHHINC
TEENBRTH
INDISTR
[RM_INDEX=1]
[RM_INDEX=2]
[RM_INDEX=3]
[RM_INDEX=4]
[RM_INDEX=5]
Intercept
MEDHHINC
TEENBRTH
INDISTR
[RM_INDEX=1]
[RM_INDEX=2]
[RM_INDEX=3]
[RM_INDEX=4]
[RM_INDEX=5]
Dependent
Variable
1992-94
grade 8
district
score (log)
a
1994-96
grade 8
district
score (log)
b
B Std. Error t Sig.
Eta
Squared
Table 9.  Parameter Estimates of Grade 8 Between-Districts Effects
Adjusted R-square = .318a.
Adjusted R-square = .253b.
This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.c.
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Grade 12.  A paired samples t-test shows a significant difference in the grade 12 within-
districts scores (t = 15.099, df =170, p = .000), but the inclusion of the contextual effects in the
multivariate model (Table 10) renders the difference in the means insignificant.  Yet, none of the
contextual effects is significant.  Thus, although contextual effects do exert an influence on the
twelfth-grade change in scores, the source of the influence cannot be pinpointed.12
Between-districts effects are the most pronounced at the twelfth grade (Table 11), and the
results most closely approximate the overall district results described previously.  Twelfth graders
in metro and metro adjacent school districts perform less well than in rural districts, and teen birth
rate is a negative influence.  A noticeable departure from previous findings is that the effect of the
independent school district is stronger in the twelfth grade than in the lower grades.  Furthermore,
the effect of the independent district on twelfth-grade performance lessens the size of the median
household income effect.  This suggests that administrative and social capital advantages
associated with independent districts may have a greater influence on twelfth-grade scores, to the
extent of partially overriding the importance of income.  This is an issue that deserves more
thorough investigation.
Implications
The present study analyzed Kentucky school district accountability index scores for the
1992-94 and 1994-96 biennia.  Repeated measures general linear modeling was used to create
two types of tests of contextual effects on the scores.  The first type of test was for within-
districts differences in the scores, incorporating the contextual effects as interaction terms.  The
12The inclusion of median household income and teen birth rate together in the
multivariate model is necessary to make the changes in the within-districts means insignificant.
1 1.708 .193 .010
1 .072 .789 .000
1 1.106 .294 .007
1 .634 .427 .004
4 .138 .968 .003
163
Source
WDS_12
WDS_12 *
MEDHHINC
WDS_12 *
TEENBRTH
WDS_12 *
INDISTR
WDS_12 *
RM_INDEX
Error(WDS_12)
df F Sig.
Eta
Squared
Table 10.  Tests of Grade 12 Within-Districts Effects
3.497 .067 52.121 .000
9.791E-06 .000 5.210 .000 .143
-5.104E-03 .001 -3.807 .000 .082
.125 .018 7.095 .000 .236
7.112E-02 .032 2.240 .026 .030
6.804E-02 .027 2.536 .012 .038
8.350E-02 .030 2.793 .006 .046
3.239E-02 .024 1.350 .179 .011
0c . . . .
3.574 .074 48.598 .000
1.030E-05 .000 5.001 .000 .133
-3.678E-03 .001 -2.503 .013 .037
.111 .019 5.739 .000 .168
6.370E-02 .035 1.831 .069 .020
7.352E-02 .029 2.500 .013 .037
8.708E-02 .033 2.658 .009 .042
2.377E-02 .026 .904 .367 .005
0c . . . .
Parameter
Intercept
MEDHHINC
TEENBRTH
INDISTR
[RM_INDEX=1]
[RM_INDEX=2]
[RM_INDEX=3]
[RM_INDEX=4]
[RM_INDEX=5]
Intercept
MEDHHINC
TEENBRTH
INDISTR
[RM_INDEX=1]
[RM_INDEX=2]
[RM_INDEX=3]
[RM_INDEX=4]
[RM_INDEX=5]
Dependent
Variable
1992-94
grade 12
district
score (log)
a
1994-96
grade 12
district
score (log)
b
B Std. Error t Sig.
Eta
Squared
Table 11.  Parameter Estimates of Grade 12 Between-Districts Effects
Adjusted R-square = .417a.
Adjusted R-square = .335b.
This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.c.
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second type of test looked at the influence of the contextual effects on between-districts scores. 
Both types of tests were run on the overall district mean scores and on grade-level scores by
district, and produced strikingly dissimilar results.  Contextual effects had little impact on the
variation in within-districts scores.  This generalization holds for both the overall district mean
scores and the grade-level scores.  The main exception was found in the grade 12 scores where
the contextual effects washed out the increase in the scores across the two biennia.  These results
support the view that Kentucky’s accountability index scores are not seriously biased by
contextual effects for short-term assessment.  On the other hand, when 30-40 percent of the
variation in between-districts scores is accounted for by contextual effects, district-to-district
comparisons cannot be fairly made without first adjusting for these effects. 
The grade-level analyses generally supported the analysis of the districts as a whole.  The
contextual effects were found to increase with the grade level in the between-districts models. 
Since the grade-level analysis approximates a school-level analysis, these results offered a basis
for cautious extrapolation of the findings to schools.  The findings suggest that, in comparisons
between schools, elementary schools are less influenced by contextual effects than either middle
or high schools.  However, this is a conclusion that needs more study.
The study findings have something to say about an issue recently debated in the press.  On
December 10, 1997, a front-page article in the Lexington Herald-Leader, reported on a proposal
made by the Office of Education Accountability (OEA).  The proposal called for changing the way
accountability scores are evaluated.  To increase the fairness of the accountability system, the OEA
recommended that school scores be adjusted for certain factors that affect school performance. 
Among these factors were student poverty rates, education level of parents, per pupil spending,
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class and school size, teacher salaries, and the district’s tax rate.13  The Director of the Prichard
Committee for Academic Excellence and the Lexington Herald-Leader in an editorial quickly
condemned the proposal.  Although the present study does not look at contextual effects on school
performance per se, its findings may serve to moderate the concerns of parties on both sides of this
controversy. No harm will come from adjusting scores to make the accountability procedures
fairer.  Still, these adjustments may not make much difference if the main focus of accountability
remains on short-term improvements within schools and within districts.
The present study has implications for the practice of ranking schools and districts. The
results strongly suggest that the news media should refrain from ranking districts and schools
based on their actual accountability index scores.14  Comparing districts (and probably schools)
in this manner is biased and can seriously mislead the public and policy makers.15  It may also
harm the self-esteem of educators, students, and parents in disadvantaged districts.  In the interest
of fairness and to ensure accurate perceptions, scores should be adjusted for contextual effects
before rankings and comparisons are made.  This recommendation is especially important for
comparisons and rankings of middle schools and high schools.
A crucial question remains which the findings of this study cannot answer:  How will
contextual effects influence the improvement potential of districts and schools over a longer span
of time?  It is conceivable that districts can improve their scores from one biennium to the next
13It should be obvious that this list contains both contextual effects and factors which are
to some degree controlled by the school district administration.
14See, for example, the report of school and district accountability index scores with
rankings in Section B of the December 5, 1997 issue of the Lexington Herald-Leader.
15Guskey and Kifer (1990) reached the same conclusion in their pre-KERA study.
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but that the rate of improvement will decline for disadvantaged districts compared with the
advantaged ones. This idea cannot be tested until performance scores for more than two biennia
become available.  The first opportunity to make such a test will be when the third biennium’s
data become available later this year. 
If it should happen that continuing research substantiates a decline in the importance of
contextual effects, this would offer dramatic confirmation that KERA is benefitting children’s
learning across the state.  The suppression of contextual effects would mean that educational
outcomes are becoming more equal, achieving one of KERA’s primary goals.
Conclusion
Repeated measures general linear modeling has proven to be an appropriate method for
assessing the two principal ways in which contextual effects may bias the accountability index
scores.  First, bias may affect test scores within educational units across successive biennia. 
Second, bias may occur when comparing test scores across units.  Taken together these paired
analyses are well suited for assessing if KERA’s system of accountability testing contributes to
greater equality of educational opportunity for Kentucky’s students.  The present study has not
found evidence to seriously fault KERA’s method of within-districts and within-schools
assessment.  On the other hand, comparisons between districts (and presumably between schools)
are quite sensitive to contextual effects.  This is an important finding because the media have
frequently made such comparisons.  The between-districts analyses also heighten the concern that
substantial long-term improvement could be an unrealistic goal for disadvantaged school districts
without the enhancement of local community resources.  A longer period to monitor the influence
of contextual effects on the accountability scores will clarify this issue.
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Appendix
For each biennium and school district the Appendix lists (1) the name of the district, (2)
the rural-metro index code, (3) the actual biennium mean score, (4) the predicted biennium mean
score obtained from the repeated measures analysis, and (5) the standardized residual.
31
DISTRICT NAME RM_INDEX Actual 1992-94 mean Predicted 1992-94 mean Z-residual
ADAIR CO 2 37.9 37.8 .03
ALLEN CO 2 37.0 38.8 -.56
ANCHORAGE IND 5 63.8 64.1 -.06
ANDERSON CO 4 41.1 41.6 -.14
ASHLAND IND 5 41.0 39.5 .45
AUGUSTA IND 4 33.7 39.8 -2.01
BALLARD CO 1 37.3 38.6 -.42
BARBOURVILLE IND 2 38.5 37.1 .45
BARDSTOWN IND 4 39.1 42.6 -1.04
BARREN CO 3 36.1 40.8 -1.47
BATH CO 4 33.9 35.1 -.42
BEECHWOOD IND 5 52.0 45.7 1.57
BELL CO 3 38.8 36.1 .88
BELLEVUE IND 5 35.2 40.7 -1.75
BEREA IND 5 42.2 38.8 1.03
BOONE CO 5 41.3 43.3 -.57
BOURBON CO 5 37.8 39.7 -.59
BOWLING GREEN IND 3 37.5 41.6 -1.24
BOYD CO 5 37.4 38.9 -.48
BOYLE CO 3 41.7 43.4 -.48
BRACKEN CO 4 38.7 38.4 .10
BREATHITT CO 1 31.8 34.3 -.93
BRECKINRIDGE CO 1 38.2 38.9 -.21
BULLITT CO 5 36.9 40.3 -1.05
BURGIN IND 4 40.6 43.2 -.75
BUTLER CO 1 38.8 36.9 .59
CALDWELL CO 4 37.7 36.8 .28
CALLOWAY CO 3 45.9 41.3 1.28
CAMPBELL CO 5 40.9 41.9 -.28
CAMPBELLSVILLE IND 2 40.7 40.4 .07
CARLISLE CO 1 41.4 39.8 .47
CARROLL CO 4 37.7 37.9 -.07
CARTER CO 5 35.5 35.2 .09
CASEY CO 1 34.5 36.9 -.80
CAVERNA IND 3 38.7 41.1 -.72
CHRISTIAN CO 5 34.7 35.2 -.18
CLARK CO 5 39.8 37.9 .60
CLAY CO 1 34.0 35.2 -.42
CLINTON CO 1 34.6 35.2 -.20
CLOVERPORT IND 1 35.4 39.3 -1.27
CORBIN IND 2 41.9 41.1 .24
COVINGTON IND 5 31.7 38.8 -2.45
CRITTENDEN CO 2 40.1 40.2 -.03
CUMBERLAND CO 1 39.0 36.5 .80
DANVILLE IND 3 41.6 44.0 -.67
DAVIESS CO 5 41.8 39.7 .62
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DISTRICT NAME RM_INDEX Actual 1992-94 mean Predicted 1992-94 mean Z-residual
DAWSON SPRINGS IND 3 42.7 39.8 .84
DAYTON IND 5 32.2 40.0 -2.62
EAST BERNSTADT IND 2 37.1 39.8 -.84
EDMONSON CO 1 40.3 37.3 .95
ELIZABETHTOWN IND 4 46.5 40.3 1.73
ELLIOTT CO 4 39.3 36.2 .97
EMINENCE IND 4 43.1 40.5 .75
ERLANGER-ELSMERE IND 5 41.6 42.3 -.20
ESTILL CO 4 36.5 36.4 .04
FAIRVIEW IND 5 34.4 39.5 -1.66
FAYETTE CO 5 42.9 38.9 1.17
FLEMING CO 2 37.4 39.1 -.54
FLOYD CO 2 35.4 37.2 -.60
FT THOMAS IND 4 53.4 40.3 3.39
FRANKFORT IND 4 38.6 44.0 -1.58
FRANKLIN CO 5 41.8 42.3 -.14
FULTON CO 2 34.2 37.5 -1.10
FULTON IND 2 37.4 38.6 -.38
GALLATIN CO 5 34.6 36.7 -.71
GARRARD CO 4 39.2 39.2 -.01
GLASGOW IND 3 42.0 41.7 .07
GRANT CO 5 37.7 38.5 -.27
GRAVES CO 2 39.6 39.7 -.02
GRAYSON CO 2 41.3 38.6 .80
GREEN CO 1 40.6 37.9 .83
GREENUP CO 5 40.2 37.5 .83
HANCOCK CO 4 42.3 42.1 .05
HARDIN CO 4 38.7 40.0 -.38
HARLAN CO 2 32.1 37.0 -1.72
HARLAN IND 2 38.4 38.5 -.04
HARRISON CO 4 43.9 39.6 1.24
HARRODSBURG IND 4 41.4 39.4 .59
HART CO 1 37.9 37.0 .30
HAZARD IND 2 43.6 38.9 1.38
HENDERSON CO 5 40.0 39.1 .29
HENRY CO 4 43.1 39.8 .97
HICKMAN CO 1 40.8 40.9 -.04
HOPKINS CO 3 39.2 40.4 -.37
JACKSON CO 4 33.5 35.1 -.57
JACKSON IND 1 34.4 36.1 -.59
JEFFERSON CO 5 37.8 38.1 -.09
JENKINS IND 2 33.4 40.5 -2.34
JESSAMINE CO 5 40.2 39.1 .33
JOHNSON CO 2 43.6 37.4 1.84
KENTON CO 5 43.2 42.5 .19
KNOTT CO 1 36.9 35.8 .38
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DISTRICT NAME RM_INDEX Actual 1992-94 mean Predicted 1992-94 mean Z-residual
KNOX CO 2 31.7 35.2 -1.26
LARUE CO 2 37.6 40.3 -.83
LAUREL CO 2 38.3 39.1 -.24
LAWRENCE CO 4 35.7 36.7 -.32
LEE CO 1 39.2 34.9 1.42
LESLIE CO 1 35.1 35.9 -.26
LETCHER CO 2 34.6 37.4 -.93
LEWIS CO 4 38.7 35.9 .90
LINCOLN CO 2 37.1 37.8 -.22
LIVINGSTON CO 1 37.2 40.5 -1.01
LOGAN CO 2 37.4 39.7 -.73
LUDLOW IND 5 42.5 39.8 .78
LYON CO 1 39.9 40.9 -.30
MADISON CO 5 38.3 37.1 .37
MAGOFFIN CO 1 37.7 35.4 .76
MARION CO 2 38.7 39.0 -.10
MARSHALL CO 2 39.8 40.9 -.32
MARTIN CO 1 36.5 36.7 -.06
MASON CO 4 38.3 38.0 .08
MAYFIELD IND 2 41.2 39.3 .57
MCCRACKEN CO 3 39.6 40.1 -.14
MCCREARY CO 1 34.9 35.6 -.22
MCLEAN CO 4 39.5 38.6 .27
MEADE CO 4 39.5 40.4 -.27
MENIFEE CO 1 36.5 38.1 -.51
MERCER CO 4 38.7 40.8 -.63
METCALFE CO 1 36.8 37.1 -.10
MIDDLESBORO IND 3 32.7 38.9 -2.10
MONROE CO 2 37.3 37.9 -.20
MONTGOMERY CO 4 38.0 37.9 .03
MONTICELLO IND 2 38.9 38.3 .18
MORGAN CO 1 40.9 36.9 1.24
MUHLENBERG CO 2 40.4 39.5 .28
MURRAY IND 3 50.2 42.4 2.03
NELSON CO 4 40.4 40.9 -.14
NEWPORT IND 5 31.8 38.4 -2.27
NICHOLAS CO 4 33.3 38.3 -1.69
OHIO CO 4 38.4 37.0 .46
OLDHAM CO 5 50.7 45.1 1.41
OWEN CO 4 38.5 38.8 -.10
OWENSBORO IND 5 39.9 38.5 .43
OWSLEY CO 1 31.3 32.8 -.55
PADUCAH IND 3 38.3 38.2 .04
PAINTSVILLE IND 2 46.3 39.1 2.04
PARIS IND 5 36.7 38.7 -.63
PENDLETON CO 5 42.6 37.5 1.55
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DISTRICT NAME RM_INDEX Actual 1992-94 mean Predicted 1992-94 mean Z-residual
PERRY CO 2 35.7 36.7 -.32
PIKE CO 2 35.8 38.7 -.94
PINEVILLE IND 3 36.9 36.7 .06
POWELL CO 4 38.9 37.0 .59
PROVIDENCE IND 4 33.3 38.8 -1.84
PULASKI CO 3 37.3 39.5 -.69
RACELAND IND 5 41.4 41.6 -.06
ROBERTSON CO 1 35.5 37.0 -.51
ROCKCASTLE CO 4 40.5 35.7 1.53
ROWAN CO 2 39.5 39.2 .10
RUSSELL CO 1 38.6 36.8 .58
RUSSELL IND 5 41.9 43.5 -.45
RUSSELLVILLE IND 2 44.1 40.2 1.11
SCIENCE HILL IND 3 49.8 42.2 2.00
SCOTT CO 5 40.8 38.3 .76
SHELBY CO 4 42.4 41.9 .13
SILVER GROVE IND 5 42.8 41.3 .43
SIMPSON CO 4 38.7 38.4 .08
SOMERSET IND 3 45.1 41.2 1.11
SOUTHGATE IND 5 51.6 42.8 2.27
SPENCER CO 4 36.6 39.4 -.90
TAYLOR CO 2 40.4 41.2 -.24
TODD CO 4 41.2 38.9 .69
TRIGG CO 4 38.6 38.1 .15
TRIMBLE CO 4 42.2 40.2 .58
UNION CO 4 38.8 40.5 -.50
WALTON VERONA IND 5 44.9 42.5 .66
WARREN CO 3 41.2 42.8 -.45
WASHINGTON CO 2 41.0 40.7 .09
WAYNE CO 2 36.1 36.5 -.14
WEBSTER CO 4 38.3 39.3 -.31
WEST POINT IND 4 33.3 39.2 -1.98
WHITLEY CO 2 38.0 36.4 .53
WILLIAMSBURG IND 2 50.1 38.9 3.06
WILLIAMSTOWN IND 5 39.6 38.5 .33
WOLFE CO 1 33.6 33.4 .08
WOODFORD CO 5 43.3 42.0 .36
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DISTRICT NAME RM_INDEX Actual 1994-96 mean Predicted 1994-96 mean Z-residual
ADAIR CO 2 41.6 43.6 -.54
ALLEN CO 2 40.3 44.4 -1.13
ANCHORAGE IND 5 63.3 66.0 -.48
ANDERSON CO 4 55.0 46.6 1.92
ASHLAND IND 5 45.9 45.0 .24
AUGUSTA IND 4 45.3 45.0 .09
BALLARD CO 1 39.6 43.1 -.99
BARBOURVILLE IND 2 41.7 42.8 -.30
BARDSTOWN IND 4 46.0 47.5 -.37
BARREN CO 3 44.4 46.2 -.46
BATH CO 4 41.9 40.7 .34
BEECHWOOD IND 5 56.2 50.4 1.25
BELL CO 3 39.2 41.9 -.76
BELLEVUE IND 5 43.9 46.0 -.55
BEREA IND 5 46.7 44.3 .62
BOONE CO 5 48.7 48.5 .06
BOURBON CO 5 43.4 45.2 -.48
BOWLING GREEN IND 3 41.9 46.9 -1.29
BOYD CO 5 46.4 44.5 .49
BOYLE CO 3 45.0 48.6 -.88
BRACKEN CO 4 41.4 43.7 -.63
BREATHITT CO 1 38.7 39.2 -.16
BRECKINRIDGE CO 1 43.6 43.4 .06
BULLITT CO 5 41.2 45.7 -1.20
BURGIN IND 4 45.3 48.0 -.66
BUTLER CO 1 43.3 41.6 .46
CALDWELL CO 4 42.9 42.3 .16
CALLOWAY CO 3 47.4 46.7 .18
CAMPBELL CO 5 44.8 47.1 -.59
CAMPBELLSVILLE IND 2 44.5 45.9 -.36
CARLISLE CO 1 48.9 44.2 1.16
CARROLL CO 4 44.0 43.3 .19
CARTER CO 5 45.3 41.1 1.13
CASEY CO 1 40.4 41.6 -.33
CAVERNA IND 3 45.7 46.4 -.18
CHRISTIAN CO 5 40.3 41.0 -.21
CLARK CO 5 46.5 43.5 .77
CLAY CO 1 40.4 40.0 .11
CLINTON CO 1 38.0 40.0 -.60
CLOVERPORT IND 1 36.7 43.7 -2.03
CORBIN IND 2 50.2 46.5 .90
COVINGTON IND 5 35.3 44.4 -2.65
CRITTENDEN CO 2 48.0 45.8 .54
CUMBERLAND CO 1 45.3 41.2 1.09
DANVILLE IND 3 46.1 49.0 -.71
DAVIESS CO 5 52.0 45.2 1.62
36
DISTRICT NAME RM_INDEX Actual 1994-96 mean Predicted 1994-96 mean Z-residual
DAWSON SPRINGS IND 3 45.9 45.3 .17
DAYTON IND 5 38.5 45.4 -1.92
EAST BERNSTADT IND 2 45.4 45.3 .02
EDMONSON CO 1 43.5 41.9 .43
ELIZABETHTOWN IND 4 51.2 45.4 1.40
ELLIOTT CO 4 43.7 41.8 .52
EMINENCE IND 4 45.4 45.6 -.05
ERLANGER-ELSMERE IND 5 47.4 47.5 -.02
ESTILL CO 4 44.1 41.9 .60
FAIRVIEW IND 5 37.3 44.9 -2.15
FAYETTE CO 5 48.0 44.5 .88
FLEMING CO 2 39.6 44.8 -1.43
FLOYD CO 2 42.0 43.0 -.27
FT THOMAS IND 4 55.6 45.4 2.35
FRANKFORT IND 4 44.6 48.7 -1.01
FRANKLIN CO 5 47.3 47.5 -.06
FULTON CO 2 37.7 43.2 -1.58
FULTON IND 2 43.1 44.2 -.29
GALLATIN CO 5 37.9 42.4 -1.31
GARRARD CO 4 45.1 44.5 .15
GLASGOW IND 3 49.5 47.0 .60
GRANT CO 5 44.6 44.2 .12
GRAVES CO 2 47.7 45.3 .61
GRAYSON CO 2 49.1 44.3 1.18
GREEN CO 1 48.6 42.5 1.56
GREENUP CO 5 41.4 43.3 -.51
HANCOCK CO 4 45.8 47.1 -.33
HARDIN CO 4 43.2 45.1 -.51
HARLAN CO 2 36.6 42.8 -1.82
HARLAN IND 2 49.0 44.2 1.20
HARRISON CO 4 51.8 44.9 1.67
HARRODSBURG IND 4 47.4 44.6 .70
HART CO 1 43.0 41.7 .37
HAZARD IND 2 49.1 44.4 1.16
HENDERSON CO 5 47.5 44.6 .72
HENRY CO 4 45.5 45.0 .13
HICKMAN CO 1 47.5 45.2 .57
HOPKINS CO 3 45.4 45.9 -.12
JACKSON CO 4 38.0 40.7 -.80
JACKSON IND 1 41.3 40.8 .15
JEFFERSON CO 5 41.8 43.7 -.52
JENKINS IND 2 35.7 46.0 -2.93
JESSAMINE CO 5 46.2 44.7 .39
JOHNSON CO 2 49.8 43.2 1.64
KENTON CO 5 49.5 47.7 .42
KNOTT CO 1 41.1 40.6 .15
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KNOX CO 2 39.6 41.1 -.43
LARUE CO 2 46.1 45.8 .07
LAUREL CO 2 44.8 44.7 .02
LAWRENCE CO 4 43.7 42.2 .41
LEE CO 1 40.0 39.7 .08
LESLIE CO 1 41.6 40.7 .27
LETCHER CO 2 40.4 43.2 -.77
LEWIS CO 4 40.0 41.4 -.41
LINCOLN CO 2 43.4 43.5 -.03
LIVINGSTON CO 1 43.8 44.8 -.26
LOGAN CO 2 41.3 45.3 -1.07
LUDLOW IND 5 46.3 45.3 .27
LYON CO 1 41.5 45.2 -1.00
MADISON CO 5 44.1 42.9 .33
MAGOFFIN CO 1 41.7 40.2 .42
MARION CO 2 45.2 44.7 .13
MARSHALL CO 2 43.5 46.4 -.74
MARTIN CO 1 40.8 41.4 -.17
MASON CO 4 39.9 43.4 -.97
MAYFIELD IND 2 43.2 44.8 -.43
MCCRACKEN CO 3 46.3 45.5 .21
MCCREARY CO 1 38.7 40.4 -.49
MCLEAN CO 4 44.2 43.9 .07
MEADE CO 4 46.8 45.5 .31
MENIFEE CO 1 41.7 42.7 -.27
MERCER CO 4 44.2 45.9 -.43
METCALFE CO 1 37.5 41.8 -1.25
MIDDLESBORO IND 3 38.7 44.4 -1.59
MONROE CO 2 46.5 43.7 .72
MONTGOMERY CO 4 44.0 43.3 .19
MONTICELLO IND 2 41.6 44.0 -.64
MORGAN CO 1 43.5 41.6 .51
MUHLENBERG CO 2 49.6 45.1 1.10
MURRAY IND 3 54.5 47.6 1.56
NELSON CO 4 43.8 46.0 -.57
NEWPORT IND 5 36.2 43.9 -2.24
NICHOLAS CO 4 38.0 43.7 -1.61
OHIO CO 4 41.5 42.4 -.25
OLDHAM CO 5 56.1 50.1 1.31
OWEN CO 4 42.3 44.1 -.49
OWENSBORO IND 5 46.5 44.1 .62
OWSLEY CO 1 38.3 37.8 .16
PADUCAH IND 3 46.5 43.7 .72
PAINTSVILLE IND 2 51.9 44.7 1.74
PARIS IND 5 43.1 44.2 -.30
PENDLETON CO 5 46.7 43.2 .91
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PERRY CO 2 38.9 42.5 -1.02
PIKE CO 2 43.3 44.4 -.29
PIKEVILLE IND 2 54.9 45.8 2.10
PINEVILLE IND 3 47.7 42.4 1.36
POWELL CO 4 43.4 42.5 .24
PROVIDENCE IND 4 36.6 44.0 -2.14
PULASKI CO 3 43.0 45.0 -.54
RACELAND IND 5 44.5 46.9 -.61
ROBERTSON CO 1 36.3 41.7 -1.59
ROCKCASTLE CO 4 48.9 41.2 1.98
ROWAN CO 2 46.6 44.9 .44
RUSSELL CO 1 46.3 41.5 1.28
RUSSELL IND 5 48.7 48.6 .04
RUSSELLVILLE IND 2 43.4 45.7 -.60
SCIENCE HILL IND 3 55.5 47.4 1.83
SCOTT CO 5 44.5 43.9 .16
SHELBY CO 4 44.6 46.9 -.59
SILVER GROVE IND 5 53.2 46.6 1.54
SIMPSON CO 4 45.9 43.8 .55
SOMERSET IND 3 49.4 46.5 .71
SOUTHGATE IND 5 52.7 47.9 1.11
SPENCER CO 4 42.0 44.7 -.72
TAYLOR CO 2 45.7 46.7 -.24
TODD CO 4 44.9 44.2 .18
TRIGG CO 4 41.4 43.5 -.57
TRIMBLE CO 4 48.4 45.4 .74
UNION CO 4 46.7 45.6 .27
WALTON VERONA IND 5 53.7 47.7 1.37
WARREN CO 3 44.8 48.0 -.79
WASHINGTON CO 2 45.2 46.2 -.26
WAYNE CO 2 41.2 42.4 -.32
WEBSTER CO 4 44.8 44.5 .07
WEST POINT IND 4 37.0 44.4 -2.12
WHITLEY CO 2 45.4 42.2 .84
WILLIAMSBURG IND 2 58.1 44.5 3.10
WILLIAMSTOWN IND 5 43.2 44.1 -.24
WOLFE CO 1 39.4 38.3 .32
WOODFORD CO 5 46.0 47.3 -.33
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